[Εξώφυλλο]

Επιλογή κόμβων διαφημιστικής προώθησης σε κοινωνικά δίκτυα με εξωτερικότητες

Δημήτριος Μ. Παπαδόπουλος

Περίληψη


In this paper we consider symmetrical networks with n nodes where nodes are consumers and the edges connecting them represent their friendship. The topological structures of generalized symmetric networks are in the form of complete network, star network and the circular network. A monopolist must choose if it is better to carry out the initial promotion of the product in a central node or the two central nodes of the symmetric network. With the use of a questionnaire that we have addressed to students of the Mathematics Department of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, we have constructed a social network of friends on Facebook and calculate the main measures of centrality network. We consider a monopolistic enterprise which has the ability to promote the product in two different ways. One is to promote the product to
the node which has the highest centrality value and the other is to promote the product to the nodes that have the two highest centrality values. And for each one way of promoting and selling the product and for each type of centrality we find optimal prices and quantities as well as profit maximizing discounted profits. Given the optimal choice of promoting and selling the product we find the centrality that gives more profit.

Key-Words Symmetrical networks, centrality measures, Monopoly, Profit maximizing discounted earnings, Viral marketing


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